INTRODUCTION

The active development of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter - PRC) and the need to increase its trade representation in the market of European countries has raised the question of a significant expansion of traffic flows between Asia and Europe and caused an increase in the development of existing transport corridors, however, based on transcontinentalism. A noticeable component of the changes in such an area is China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative. The implementation of this plan is impossible without the active involvement of other countries, especially when it comes to maritime transportation. For this reason, in the global Chinese initiative has allocated a separate direction “Maritime Silk Road XXI century.” Oriented on the development of cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia. Although the project is still at the development stage, however, highlighting all the risks of China’s cooperation with the countries of this region actualizes this task for researchers.

The purpose of our exploration is to highlight the prospects and problems of cooperation between the PRC and Southeast Asian countries in the implementation of the said project.

In our opinion, the said initiative is still far from being finally implemented, given the number of problems it has encountered. At the same time, the project looks quite promising, capable of improving the infrastructure and transport industry in Southeast Asia. Achieving this goal is complex and requires thorough work. However, to date, there are more obstacles to implementation than favorable circumstances.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of the “One Belt, One Road” project raises a lot of discussions, as leading experts are trying to predict the results of such a large-scale project in different ways. A. Fiano explains the basic history of this program, in addition, the researcher tries to broadly characterize the potential opportunities for specific regions of the world (FIANO, 2018). K. Lili believes that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a powerful initiative that will open up new opportunities in the future, especially in the regions of Africa and Eurasia (LILI, 2018). B. Shrestha proves that this program is of great importance in regional cooperation, because, according to the author, it will unite the PRC with other states, promote powerful financial investments and the formation of new jobs, etc. (SHRESTHA, 2017). K. Cheng thoroughly examined the One Belt, One Road initiative through the prima facie potential trade and investment opportunities (CHENG, 2016). Some variations of the project name were analyzed by W. Shepard (SHEPARD, 2017). N. Casarini in his study explored the importance of the “Belt and Road” for the further development of Southeast Asian security. The scholar believes that this region will be the future main base for Chinese investment projects (CASARINI, 2018).

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the position of the said initiative in Southeast Asia was highlighted by Kaho Yu. The author also paid his attention to the current relations between China and Myanmar, analyzed the impact of investment international projects on this state (KAHO, 2021). The mentioned initiative became a subject of research for Ukrainian and Russian specialists as well. The analysis of China’s interests and actual goals of the “Belt and Road” was highlighted by Ukrainets L. The researcher focused on the economic significance of the project (UKRAINETS, 2019). Ignatiev S. analyzed the place of South-East Asia in the initiative “One Belt - One Road”, in addition, the author in the work characterized the main risks on the way to the project. Among the latter, he singles out piracy, maritime terrorism, and transnational crime inherent in this region (IGNATIEV, 2018). Terskyh M. highlighted Vietnam’s positions on the implementation of the Belt and Road (TERSKYH, 2019). Consequently, research on this initiative requires further elucidation of its main perspectives, where the main role belongs to the Southeast Asian region.
METHOD
The article is based on the use of analytical methods. It is a detailed study of economic, statistical, political, and historical information through the prism of the current socio-political situation in the countries of Southeast Asia. For the sake of a successful and understandable construction of the material an overview of the processes taking place in each country of the region under study, which is differently involved in the initiative “One Belt, One Road” is made. This structure allows for a discussion with international observers, to establish parallels in the positions of the governments of the South Asian countries.

In the work applied theoretical methods of research, among them we will highlight axiomatic, which relies on certain starting points - axioms, from which the following knowledge and theories are logically derived. The historical one provides a description of the real process of emergence and development of the object of research. The international system of foreign policy relations in Southeast Asia is investigated based on a system analysis, with which the mentioned region is identified with a set of stable interrelations, which are simultaneously dynamically developing. In addition, the work used general scientific methods of research: analysis, synthesis, and comparison. As a result, an objective position on the coverage of the role of Southeast Asia in the project “One Belt, One Road” was achieved.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative The aim of the One Belt, One Road Initiative (hereinafter referred to as the OBOR) is to form strong economic ties in place of the ancient Silk Road. The beginning of this uneasy undertaking took place on September 7, 2013, when Chinese President Xi Jinping, during his official visit to Kazakhstan, put forward the concept of the so-called Silk Road Economic Belt (CHENG, 2016). It was intended to strengthen China’s trade and economic cooperation with Asian states by forming land transportation systems. Apparently, the concept had matured long ago, because a month later, during official visits to Indonesia, Xi Jinping gave a detailed presentation of its contents and called for the creation of the XXI Century Maritime Silk Road, the main goal of which was also declared the strengthening of China’s trade and economic relations with Southeast Asian countries (FIANO, 2018).

Later, these new ideas of the PRC’s foreign economic activities were called the “State Initiative of China’s Highest-Level Cooperation One Belt, One Road,” or OBOR for short. This initiative has led to considerable debate among experts against the backdrop of the global context, the so-called “Chinese Dream” (RUWITCH BLANCHARD, 2017). The “Maritime Silk Road” has its own history of naming. Back in 1877 the German scientist Ferdinand von Richthofen distinguished the term “Seidenstraße”, which meant “silk road”. The German geographer suggested using this term to refer to the caravan road, which connected the regions of East Asia with the Mediterranean in ancient and medieval times (KIKTENKO, 2018).

Therefore, first came the concept of forming a continuous trade space from Europe to Asia. Note that the modern Chinese initiative - is the reverse of the original project because it involves movement from Asia to Europe (KIKTENKO, 2018). The German scientist proposed a solution to build a railroad from Europe to Eastern China (Germany had its own interests in this region at the time), but because of his death in 1905, this plan could not be realized. Subsequent events that erupted later, as well as World War I, made it generally impossible to implement this idea. Despite this, it remains important that the German scholar not only proposed such a name but was also the first to enshrine the concept that China could be the initiator or key object of the long-standing Silk Road. Note that de facto this route was crossed by various traders and China itself was primarily interested in obtaining various precious items, gold, horses from the then.

The globality of the current project differs markedly in scale from the old routes that connected China of the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) and the Tang (618-906 CE) with the regions of Central Asia. It is difficult to compare the then and modern trade volumes on this route, however, most experts agree that the ancient and medieval trade was small and almost local (KIKTENKO, 2018). First, this route was used to transport silk and silk products from China, with what we associate the proposed name by Ferdinand von Richthofen (SHAH, 2016).
To date, about 60 states and intergovernmental organizations are involved in this initiative. At the official level, the Chinese side notes that the OBOR is generally aimed at strengthening intergovernmental cooperation, creating special conditions for trade, eliminating financial and other barriers, deepening cooperation in the areas of transport with the creation of an infrastructure network of facilities that will combine Asia, Europe, and Africa, as well as multilateral cooperation through cultural and scientific exchanges (SCISSORS, 2019).

XXI Century Maritime Silk Road is the maritime component of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative and provides for the creation of three major trade and economic corridors:

1. China - Indian Ocean - Africa - Mediterranean Sea
2. China - Oceania - South Pacific
3. In the future, a corridor through the Arctic Ocean to Europe is envisioned (UKRAINETS, 2018).

In our opinion, due to the U.S. withdrawal from the “transoceanic partnership” (TTP), the Chinese project “Maritime Silk Road ...” may become an alternative solution regarding the plane of economic integration of the Southeast Asian region. In general, the region under study is very sensitive to fluctuations in relations between the United States and China, any strategic initiatives take root here more slowly, but given the policy of the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden, the PRC government can count on success and make efforts to form a new transport system, uniting many ports of Southeast Asia.

The importance of this region stems from the fact that the entry of Asian countries into the international market (primarily Europe) will also strengthen China’s global position (Marcel, D. 2018). Southeast Asia, due to its geographic location and trade importance, is considered the “first line” of PRC’s interests.

At the same time, the PRC initiative is supported by countries on the northern coast of the Indian Ocean. For example, the interest of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Indochina is due to the prospects of stimulating investment in various projects (transport, science, logistics, etc.). In this regard, great hopes are pinned on the cooperation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (IGNATIEV, 2018). In total, despite the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic from January to June 2020, Chinese companies invested 72180000000. Yuan in direct non-financial investments in 54 countries along the Belt and Road. That's a 34% increase over the same period last year. These countries included Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, the Philippines (TAYLOR, 2020).

The interests of the project under consideration are generally in line with Chinese policy. It is planned that because of the implementation of the initiative there will be a significant promotion of Chinese goods (CHENG, 2016). The latter will require a reduction in the transport distance between East and West, reducing the cost of supplying goods. Such a reduction in the future will be a significant economic base for the countries whose territories will pass through the transport routes. China’s initiative aims to increase markets for goods and services. Thus, within the framework of the “Belt and Road” a digital silk road is also being created. Such a project will provide rapid exchange of information and communications, Internet banking, e-commerce, etc. (UKRAINETS, 2018). Such work would seem to greatly facilitate the processing of commodity products and entail customs unification at borders. In the implementation of investment treaties in states along the Silk Road, the PRC will strictly protect controlling stakes in joint ventures, which constitute a notable share of their ownership. China will also try to secure at least half of the income from their operations and, if possible, full export of raw materials to China for processing (FIANO, 2018). Many projects abroad will be implemented by Chinese specialists and workers. Accordingly, the PRC government will be able to solve the problem of excess labor at home (which is caused by a decrease in economic growth) by settling it abroad (GLANTZ, 2017). Continental routes and their development could provide a credible alternative for PRC infrastructure. In general, trade through the new Silk Road will take place through the RMB-based financial system. Thus, the PRC is trying to form a new original
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financial base to connect powerful regional banks and cause the growth of settlement in the PRC’s national currency (FOLLATH, 2016).

At the same time, the positions of Southeast Asian countries on China’s proposed initiative vary greatly and depend on political realities.

The Indonesian government understands that transforming their country into a powerful transit-sea artery is possible only with active financial and technical support from Beijing. However, Indonesia is an active member of ASEAN, so compromises need to be made with the bloc’s allies, including on political issues. To achieve their goals, the Indonesian authorities may make concessions on the issues of the South China Sea islands. For this reason, ASEAN may split into several blocs: a pro-China bloc led by Vietnam and a pro-China bloc with Indonesia and the Philippines playing the main role (IGNATIEV, 2018).

Vietnam occupies a prominent place in the implementation of the “One Belt, One Road“ project. The attitude of the government of this country in Chinese initiatives is ambiguous. On the one hand, the Vietnamese authorities count on a strong impetus that will support the dynamic development of the local economy (TERSKYH, 2019). There is indeed a solid basis for such optimistic forecasts the trade turnover between the countries in 2018 alone was more than 100 billion U.S. dollars, and the COVID-19 pandemic did not seriously damage these positive dynamics. Accordingly, the PRC has become the 7th largest investor in industry and services in Vietnam. It is true that Vietnamese policymakers have a significant role in the negative historical experience in the coexistence of the two countries (HAMZAH, 2018). At the same time, Vietnam is increasingly trying to act independently in the initiative, so it does not want to force events on its further rapid promotion and ratification. Vietnamese experts are familiar with the economic models of PRC companies. These include weak social protection of workers’ rights and neglect of environmental issues (TERSKYH, 2019). Despite this, the U.S. and Japan continue to be among the leaders among Vietnam’s partner countries, so the latter has room for political maneuvering.

One should also consider the previous experience of PRC investment projects, which shows that Chinese banks lend at high interest rates. For this reason, the Vietnamese government hopes to further attract concessional loans from Japan and deepen economic cooperation with the United States. Regarding the latter, it is known that between 2011 and 2017, Vietnam was able to attract investments from Japan. Vietnam was able to attract more than $10 billion in investments for infrastructure projects (TERSKYH, 2019).

Myanmar is strategically important to China as part of the initiative. It is because of its southern neighbor that the PRC plans to build oil and gas pipelines to its southern provinces. For this reason, Beijing seeks to gain the support of the official Naypyido (KAHO, 2021). The Myanmar government in turn has also flirted with China, trying to use the influence of the Celestial Empire as a counter to Western countries. We are talking about ethnic confrontation with the Rohingya Muslim communities. Western democracies accuse the authorities of Myanmar of infringing upon the Muslim migrants and are apparently trying to use the problem to put pressure on the government of that country. The U.S. and Western Europe have imposed military sanctions on Myanmar, accusing the state leadership of massive human rights violations. The reason for such a reaction was the events in the Rakhine state, where the Burmese military brutally treated the local Muslim rebels. In January 2020, Xi Jinping paid an official visit to Myanmar, whereby the leader of China unambiguously demonstrated his readiness to continue cooperation even despite international isolation. As a result, the two countries signed 33 agreements that fixed key projects of the One Belt, One Road initiative. Official Beijing and Nay Pyi Taw agreed to create an economic corridor that would link Southwest China to the Indian Ocean (KARAHAN, 2015). In the rebellious Rakhine State, appropriate deep-water works are planned that would allow local ports to receive ships and larger displacements. This refers primarily to the Chao Phya transport hub, which provides Beijing with an alternative route for importing energy resources, bypassing the unreliable (due to geopolitical reasons) narrow Strait of Malacca.

But not all leading Burmese politicians view this Chinese initiative favorably (KAHO, 2021). They are concerned that the improved ports will primarily be used by Chinese companies,
while local producers of goods and services simply lack the capacity to take advantage of the “new Silk Road”. In addition, China can use this territory for its own military purposes.

The main problem for the approval of the “One Belt, One Road” project in Myanmar is the deep distrust of many local politicians regarding the “good intentions” of the PRC. China has repeatedly tried to claim a part of the country’s territory, so its reputation among ordinary Burmese is rather negative. Additionally, the rift between Myanmar and the PRC is exacerbated by the presence of separatists in the Burmese North (YAN, 2018). We are talking about the quasi-state entity of Wa, which is “located” along the Chinese border, and apparently receives substantial assistance from there. Burmese separatist leaders, incidentally, openly declare Chinese support for their movement. The quasi-state currency in this entity is the Chinese yuan, and the pseudo-state language is Chinese.

The upheaval in Myanmar in 2021 further complicated the business environment in the country, raising Chinese projects at direct risk and jeopardizing Beijing’s economic interests in the country (KAHO, 2021). Public disorder, anti-Chinese sentiment, and Myanmar’s attempt to reduce China’s influence have brought economic cooperation projects to the center of domestic political debate (KAHO, 2021). It is reported that some Chinese enterprises in Myanmar have stopped and are releasing auxiliary personnel. It also remains unclear whether the military government will honor or review Chinese projects and agreements previously approved by the Suu Kyi administration. However, once the political instability subsides, the PRC is likely to resume efforts to integrate Myanmar into its economic orbit. The current political uncertainty will certainly lead to some stagnation in Myanmar’s investment policy (HUGHES, 2019).

Overall, Beijing expects that further investment in the country will contribute to energy security, market creation, and stability in good neighborly relations (YAN, 2018). PRC authorities argue that the economic decline of its “neighbors” will lead to social instability and security threats, which, in turn, could threaten the political stability of Chinese border provinces such as Yunnan. However, from Myanmar’s perspective, in addition to the political risks outlined above, there are long-term uncertainties regarding the commercial viability and risks of the proposed mega-projects (KAHO, 2021).

At the same time, the Indonesian government is positive about participation in the said project. The official summary of the Indonesian authorities notes that the state is ready to develop the country’s transport and economic highways, however, on the famous resort island of Bali. As of 2019, Indonesian authorities were ready for full cooperation with China, stating that the “One Belt, One Road” initiative will give impetus to other infrastructure projects in the country. Indonesia plans to use the Chinese network to improve its own transport and logistics system, as well as to increase the throughput capacity of the port of Kuala Tanjung (HUGHES, 2019). For the Chinese initiative, the country’s authorities plan to allocate four corridors. They are in the provinces of North Sumatra, North Kalimantan, Bali, and North Sulawesi. These regions are densely populated, with a total of more than 30 million people. However, this labor potential is at odds with the policy of the PRC and its companies to attract Chinese professionals and workers (SHAH, 2016). At the moment, there is no solution to this problem, and for this reason, the Indonesian government has been somewhat cautious about the prospects of this international project in recent years.

The Singapore authorities said they were ready to be almost the main investor in the initiative. Given the previous successful experience of implementing joint projects with China (the Chongqing project), Singapore believes in the successful implementation of this project as well. The financial institutions of this Asian country are ready to pour large funds into the economies of third countries in Southeast Asia. Thus, the official positions of Singapore and the PRC are the same: the governments of both countries are ready to create international mechanisms to resolve possible trade and economic disputes within the “Belt and Road” (KANG, 2018). There has been significant progress in this direction, and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed at the 2019 China-Singapore international conference on resolving interstate disputes. The said document was adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and the Singapore Mediation Center for Dispute Resolution.
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This will allow for the future joint development of rules, legal procedures, and unified protocols for resolving international cases under the initiative. The memorandum notes that the legal alliance will include not only representatives from China and Singapore, but also specialists from other Asian countries that have supported the project.

The Philippines is generally supportive of the OBOR initiative. At talks in Beijing, the two sides agreed to intensify cooperation on the Chinese project (HUGHES, 2019). Specifically, the countries agreed to build two key segments of the initiative on the Philippine island of Luzon and Davao City, as well as to establish a new industrial park in New Clark City. In addition, Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly stressed that joint work between the two countries promotes security in the South Asian region.

An additional factor of stability in Southeast Asia was to be the cooperation between the PRC and Japan, the region’s two largest economies. In particular, the Japanese government considered regional economic partnership mechanisms, strengthening cooperation with China in various areas (KANG, 2018). At the same time, Japan, as one of the world’s leading manufacturing countries, puts forward several of its requirements to China: financial assistance to those countries supporting the initiative, recoupment, and transparency and openness in various domestic projects (IGNATIEV, 2018).

At the same time, several problems arise in the implementation of Chinese initiatives. In August 2018, Malaysian authorities stopped the construction of a 688-kilometer railroad, which was supposed to connect the western and eastern parts of the country by a direct route. The reason was overpricing by the Chinese contractor and refusal to use Malaysians as labor. In 2017 Sri Lankas was forced to give up the important strategic deep-sea port of Hambantota to a Chinese bank, due to the inability to pay $140,000,000 dollars’ loan.

Consequently, the project has certain risks. There are such features of this region: terrorism, piracy, the activity of organized crime syndicates, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea (IGNATIEV, 2018). While the first factors are internationally controllable and will receive an immediate response, organized crime, and the political claims of several states to islands in the South China Sea act as complex challenges.

Money laundering on prospective projects is a “tradition” in East Asia, particularly in the PRC (this is with strict countermeasures against criminals). “Black” money could potentially pose a serious problem for business activity in the region (FIANO, 2018). However, territorial disputes look even more problematic. The PRC authorities, to implement “OBOR,” plans to use their foreign policy white paper. This book explicitly states that the islands of the South China Sea are recognized as Chinese territory (IGNATIEV, 2018). All attempts to revise this decision are seen by the authorities of the Celestial Empire as an infringement on its territorial integrity. Such rhetoric, accordingly, will hinder the smooth operation of new trade and economic arteries. This political factor, in our opinion, will be the greatest danger to the smooth operation of new trade and economic arteries. This political factor, in our opinion, will be the greatest danger to the continuation of work within the framework of the creation of the “New Silk Road” of the XX century. In addition, in practice, the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea will provoke distrust of the PRC on the part of other Southeast Asian states (SHEPARD, 2017).

At the same time, the transport corridors mentioned in this initiative can in practice tangibly improve the situation of trade and international investment in Southeast Asia. However, this result is only possible if there are thorough political reforms in the countries through whose territory the “new Silk road” will pass. We are talking about transformations that will promote administrative transparency, expand trade, increase economic attractiveness, reduce government debts, overcome environmental, social and corruption risks (IGNATIEV, 2018). Consequently, infrastructure and economic policy problems in Southeast Asian countries (potential participants in the Chinese initiative) hinder the normal attraction of foreign investment.

Transportation projects under the initiative in question can help expand trade and reduce poverty by reducing trade costs (SHEPARD, 2017). Even so, for some Southeast Asian countries, the costs of building new infrastructure may outstrip the potential revenues from it (SCISSORS, 2019). Related policy reforms, on the one hand, can enhance the positive impact of OBOR transportation projects; on the other hand, for some countries, reforms are a prerequisite for the net benefits of these transportation projects. Thus, there are several risks
in the initiative for the states of Southeast Asia, the lack of transparency and openness of the project can contribute to their deepening. The weakness of the economies of individual Southeast Asian states is also no less important (HUGHES, 2019).

In addition, transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia is an important challenge to the implementation of the New Silk Road. Cross-national criminal groups are expanding their diverse trade and smuggling activities through the countries of the region in question. According to the UN, Southeast Asia is one of the largest markets for trafficking in drugs and other illicit items (IGNATIEV, 2018).

The lack of regional cooperation among Southeast Asian countries, their imperfect legal system, and ineffective regulation of interstate borders are all exploited by illicit transnational groups in their practices. Based on the route of the New Silk Road of the twenty-first century, the South China Sea and the Straits of Singapore and Malacca. This situation in the said region negatively affects the implementation of a new system of regional exchanges, further development of trade and infrastructure (HUGHES, 2019).

Despite this, China’s economic ties with Southeast Asian countries remain strong, even as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to negatively affect global trade and investment. China’s financial investments in Southeast Asia from 2014 to 2019. Rising from $16.8 billion to $29.3 billion in 2019. From 2013 to 2019. One Belt, One Road Initiative contracts of all kinds accounted for 46.2% of investments in Southeast Asia. Despite this, despite the steep drop in total investment under Project 2020, Southeast Asia was the largest investment base of the PRC, accounting for 36% of total investment. Such data suggests that during the pandemic, the Southeast Asian market has become more important for PRC investment. This is because China redirected its financial initiatives to Southeast Asia because of the fight against the coronavirus in the West, which led to increased geopolitical tensions between the PRC and Western countries.

DISCUSSION
The main subject of discussion around the topic of the One Belt, One Road project has been the issue of future risks on the way to its implementation. In addition, the analysis of the main interests of China itself has also generated a lot of unclear points in academic circles. For example, the transport corridors mentioned in this program can in practice tangibly improve the situation in trade and international investment in Southeast Asia (UKRAINETS, 2018). However, such a result is possible only under the condition of political, economic, social reforms in the countries of this region. Some, scholars, however, and Shepard W. are skeptical about the possibility of such dramatic changes in these countries, and believe that, in fact, China seeks to use these territories to spread its own international influence (SHEPARD, 2017). Despite this, other authors boldly defend the thesis of a “bright future” for Southeast Asian countries because of this project (GLANTZ, 2017; FIANO, 2018; LILLI, 2018) Thus, the major risks for states in this region remain in the discussion field. In our view, the region is now in dire need of transformations that promote administrative transparency, expand trade, increase economic attractiveness, reduce public debts, and overcome environmental, social, and corruption risks. Thus, due to overcoming infrastructure and economic policy problems in Southeast Asian countries (potential participants in the Chinese initiative), there will be a normal attraction of foreign investment (IGNATIEV, 2018). Redeveloped infrastructure can help overcome many of the problems faced by the region, but it requires considerable government spending.

The problem of figuring out the main interests of the PRC generates additional discussion. Today it is difficult to predict the behavior of this world leader in Southeast Asia, because, as practice shows, the region is prone to fluctuating relations between China and the United States. In addition, the military coup in Myanmar showed the complexity of implementing such projects in practice in this region.

CONCLUSION
For example, the One Belt, One Road initiative offers tremendous opportunities for investment and development in Southeast Asia. It has been proven that the strategic initiative in the implementation of this project belonged to China. Southeast Asian countries occupy a key place in Chinese investment programs. The importance of this territory can be explained by several factors. On the one hand, the countries of this region are important trading partners of the PRC, on the other hand, the implementation of this project is directly related to the further economic development of Chinese provinces. In addition, the entry of Asian countries into the international market (primarily Europe) will also strengthen China’s global position. The paper found that due to the U.S. withdrawal from the “transoceanic partnership” (TPP) initiative “Maritime Silk Road XXI century” can become an alternative solution regarding the plane of economic integration of the countries of the Southeast Asian region.

Also, the article notes that there are many obstacles to the implementation of this ambitious project. This is due to both criminal (piracy, terrorism, corruption) and political circumstances. For example, those Southeast Asian countries that maintain close economic trade contacts with the United States or Japan do not want a dramatic increase in China’s role in the region. The insufficient level of regional cooperation between the countries of Southeast Asia, their imperfect legal system, ineffective regulation of international borders all contributes to the illegal activities of various transnational groups. At the same time, official Beijing continues to take measures to implement its project. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic continues to negatively affect global trade and investment, Chinese financial investment in the region from 2019-2021 onward. Continue to grow. Obviously, ways to further implement the “One Belt, One Road” project should be a thorough subject for further academic discussion, if only in terms of the scale of the necessary transformations.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
The author reports no conflict of interests.

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Sudeste asiático no cinturão único, uma iniciativa rodoviária

El sudeste asiático en la iniciativa “un cinturón, una ruta”

Resumo
O artigo descreve a iniciativa “One Belt, One Road” da China, ao exemplo de sua implementação na região do Sudeste Asiático. Ao mesmo tempo, o jornal investiga o pano de fundo para a formação desse projeto. Portanto, o artigo observa que as posições dos países do Sudeste Asiático sobre a iniciativa proposta pela China variam em grande parte e dependem de realidades políticas. A partir de uma análise da situação política e econômica dos países da região, destacam-se detalhadamente as atitudes de Mianmar, Indonésia, Vietnã, Cingapura, Filipinas e Japão em relação a esta iniciativa chinesa. O jornal aponta que o recente golpe de Estado em Mianmar 2021 complicou ainda mais o ambiente de negócios no país, não apenas colocando projetos chineses em risco direto, mas também ameaçando os interesses econômicos de Pequim no país. Além disso, o artigo caracteriza os principais riscos e desafios da implementação das iniciativas da RPC. Ele descobre que há muitos desafios para a implementação deste programa.


Abstract
The article describes the Chinese initiative “One Belt, One Road” by the example of its implementation in the region of Southeast Asia. At the same time, the paper investigates the prehistory of the formation of this project. Therefore, the article notes that the positions of Southeast Asian countries on the initiative proposed by China vary greatly and depend on political realities. Based on the analysis of the political and economic situation of the countries of this region the attitudes of Myanmar, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines and Japan to this Chinese initiative are highlighted in detail. The paper notes that the recent coup in Myanmar 2021 has further complicated the business environment in the country, not only putting Chinese projects at direct risk, but also threatening Beijing’s economic interests in the country. In addition, the article characterizes the key risks and problems of the implementation of PRC initiatives. It is established that there are many problems on the way to the implementation of the said program.

Keywords: One belt. One road initiative. Silk road. PRC. Southeast Asia.

Resumen
El artículo describe la iniciativa china “Un cinturón, una ruta” a través del ejemplo de su aplicación en la región del Sudeste Asiático. Al mismo tiempo, el documento investiga los antecedentes de la formación de dicho proyecto. Por lo tanto, el artículo señala que las posiciones de los países del Sudeste Asiático sobre la iniciativa propuesta por China varían en gran medida y dependen de las realidades políticas. A partir de un análisis de la situación política y económica de los países de la región, se destacan en detalle las actitudes de Myanmar, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapur, Filipinas y Japón hacia esta iniciativa china. El documento señala que el reciente golpe de Estado en Myanmar 2021 ha complicado aún más el entorno empresarial en el país, no sólo poniendo en riesgo directo los proyectos chinos, sino también amenaçando los intereses económicos de Pekín en el país. Además, el artículo caracteriza los principales riesgos y desafíos de la aplicación de las iniciativas de la RPC. El informe constata que la aplicación de dicho programa presenta numerosos problemas.

Palabras-clave: Un cinturón. Una ruta. La ruta de la seda. PRC. Sudeste de Asia.