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INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the executive power system in the Russian Federation is devoted to the scientific works of N.Yu. Khmaneneva, O.E. Kutafin, V.V. Grib, L.Yu. Grudtsyna, V.E. Chirkin and several other authors. These works provide the basis for the analysis of the theoretical content of the executive branch in relation to its social essence. However, the share of research that highlight the problems and prospects of increasing the role and place of the State Council of the Russian Federation and plenipotentiary representatives of the President of Russia in the federal districts in coordinating the country's executive branch and overcoming centrifugal political trends is extremely small. In this regard, the main purpose of this research is a comprehensive study of executive institutions such as the State Council of the Russian Federation and plenipotentiary representatives of the President of Russia in the Federal districts in order to expand and clarify the conceptual and categorical apparatus of the science of constitutional law in the field of executive power having formed a holistic concept of the optimal organization and exercise of executive power in Russia, and the subject of research is the regulatory the new base for the formation and functioning of the executive power system abroad and in the Russian Federation, as well as scientific views on the problems and prospects of increasing the role and place of the above-mentioned institutions of state power in coordinating the executive power system in the country and overcoming centrifugal political trends.

METHODOLOGY
This article in the process of cognition of state-legal phenomena were used: a) General scientific methods (formal-logical, systemic, structural-functional, concrete-historical); b) General logical methods of theoretical analysis (analysis, synthesis, generalization, comparison, abstraction, analogy, modeling, etc.); c) private scientific methods (technical and legal analysis, specification, interpretation, etc.) (ZALESNY, GONCHAROV, 2019: 129-142; ZALESNY, GONCHAROV, 2020: 1-6).
RESULTS
The first decade of the existence of Russia as an independent state was accompanied by a significant weakening of the role and influence of the federal center, the growth of centrifugal tendencies in managing a unified system of executive power, and in some cases by undisguised separatism and nationalism of regional power in some republics within the country (Chechen Republic, Tatarstan) (TKHABISIMOVA, 2001).

Loss of effectiveness in governing the country, on the one hand, turned into a stagnation of the economy and a decline in the standard of living of most of the population of Russia, and, on the other hand, a gigantic increase in corruption in the executive branch and, above all, at the regional level. In his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation dated 08.07.2000, President V.V. Putin outlined the need to strengthen the single Executive vertical based on the law, and the country’s transition from a decentralized state to a full-fledged federal state (MESSAGE, 2000).

To fulfill the above tasks to coordinate the system of executive power in the country and to overcome centrifugal political trends, the head of state carried out a large-scale reform of the executive branch in the country, and Russian legislation underwent a significant change. The most important institutional instruments for such a restructuring of the public administration system as conceived by V.V. Putin became the State Council of the Russian Federation created by him and the plenipotentiary representatives of the President of Russia in the Federal districts.

Currently, discussions in the Russian educational and scientific literature, as well as in the media, regarding the creation by the President of the country of his Decree dated 01.09.2000 № 1602 «On the State Council of the Russian Federation» (ABOUT, 2000: 3633) of a new deliberative body - the State Council of Russia, as a rule, are linked to the fact that his appearance was one of the symptoms of the crisis experienced by Russian federalism at present (ZAKHAROV, KAPISSHIN, 2001: 36-40), a harbinger of his imminent death (Federalism, 2001: 79-80).

However, in reality, this Decree marked a new stage in the centralization of state power, carried out by the head of state V.V. Putin. In this regard, it is necessary to deal with the reasons for the creation of this advisory body under the President of the country and determine its place in the system of state authorities of the Russian Federation.

According to most prominent scientists and political scientists, the appearance of the Decree of the President of Russia on the State Council of the Russian Federation was the result of a compromise that ended the confrontation between the head of state and governors in the matter of strengthening state power (DMITRIEV, 2000: 88-93), which satisfied both sides (DMITRIEV, 2000: 5-14); this state institution has become an effective instrument for implementing presidential policies. In his annual Address to the Federal Assembly, V. Putin in this regard paid special attention to the problem of modernizing the executive power system as a whole, defining the scope of tasks for such transformations: firstly, «the structure of the executive branch should be logical and rational, and the state apparatus should become operational instrument ... implementation of public policy»; secondly, according to the head of state, it is necessary to create «an effective and clear technology for the development, adoption and implementation of decisions»; thirdly, it should «conduct an analysis of the currently implemented state functions and keep only the necessary ones» (MESSAGE, 2002).

It seems that the State Council of the Russian Federation was created to solve these problems.

There are several main reasons for the creation of the State Council. The first reason, in our opinion, was the need for the head of state to coordinate the executive branch in the regions through a single institution operating under his direct supervision. According to the current legislation, the President of the country, although it has certain control and oversight powers over the regional executive branch (by, for example, temporarily removing regional leaders from power, as well as submitting candidates for these positions to regional parliaments), but directly the executive bodies in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation neither him, nor the Government of the country are not subordinate. This corresponds to the principle of vertical separation of powers (NARLIEV, 2006: 45-50), but slows down the process of
implementing managerial decisions and creates the basis for sabotaging the implementation of federal projects and programs.

The next major reason for such transformations is that after the entry into force of the Federal Law on the formation of the Federation Council on a new principle (one representative from the executive and legislative (representative) authorities from each subject of Russia), the real role of regional leaders of executive and legislative (representative) authorities, they lost the ability to really influence the federal legislative process, their status changed (they are deprived of the parliament intact venous). The upper house of parliament got a chance to become more professional and efficient from a legislative point of view, but has seriously lost its political weight at the moment (due to the fact that in it, like in the State Duma, more than half of the members are representatives of the «United Russia» party) is just an additional link in the stamping of laws adopted on patterns made in the bowels of the administration of the head of state and the Government of the Russian Federation.

In the former Federation Council, all its members were formally equal, despite the economic inequality of the territories they represented, and in the aggregate personified the power of all regions of the country. In the State Council, the leading role is assigned to seven members of the Presidium, who, in accordance with presidential preferences, receive privileged access to the head of state.

The third reason for the emergence of the State Council was the creation of the institution of plenipotentiaries of the President of the Russian Federation in the federal districts, since after the vertical dispersal of the presidential power, the Kremlin's awareness of the state and development of local problems has weakened. A new source of replenishment of information was the new deliberative body under the head of state.

In addition, the need for the completion of socio-economic and political transformations in the country has increased. The President of Russia at the meetings of the Presidium of the State Council noted that with the help of the latter, important reform measures will be planned: reform of local self-government and delimitation of subjects of jurisdiction; reform of the education system and the Higher School in the Russian Federation; housing and communal services reform; land reform and the creation of a civilized land market; reform of the transport system of Russia and the elimination of natural monopolies in this industry (SPEECH, 2020).

In addition, the implementation of priority national projects planned by the President of the Russian Federation («Education», «Health», «Development of the agro-industrial complex», «Affordable and comfortable housing for Russian citizens») was carried out in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation directly with the assistance of the State Council of Russia.

It seems that the State Council of the Russian Federation occupies a special place in the system of government bodies of Russia (LUCHIN, DANILOV, 2001: 19-28): on the one hand, it is an advisory body that promotes the implementation of the powers of the head of state on ensuring the coordinated functioning and interaction of government bodies; and on the other hand, its members are not only senior officials (heads of the highest executive bodies of state power) of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, elected by regional parliaments, independently exercising state power in the field, but also persons who have replaced the above positions for two or more terms in a row.

At the same time, the Chairman of the State Council is the head of the Russian state himself. The role of the State Council in relation to the unified system of executive power in Russia is largely determined by the tasks it solves, which can be conditionally divided into the following groups: assistance in the implementation of the powers of the head of state; consideration of draft federal laws and decrees of the President of Russia; discussion of issues of national importance and great social significance.

The first group of tasks may include, for example, the provision by the State Council of assistance in the exercise of the powers of the head of state when he uses conciliation procedures to resolve disagreements between Federal and regional government bodies.
The second group of tasks includes consideration of the draft Federal Law on the Federal budget for the next financial year and other draft federal laws and decrees of the President of Russia that are of national importance.

The third (most voluminous) group of tasks solved by the State Council includes a discussion of the main issues of personnel policy in the country, as well as discussion at the proposal of the head of state of other issues of important state significance.

It seems that the six years of the existence of the State Council of the Russian Federation showed a clear inadequacy of its exclusively advisory functions under the head of state, which, firstly, impedes the implementation of large-scale events to bring acts of the regional executive branch in line with federal law, and secondly, does not allow full participation in Federal political life.

Due to the fact that the State Council, and especially the Presidium, includes regional leaders who are not directly subordinate to the President of Russia, it is necessary to determine the legal status of this body in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, giving it the right to legislative initiative.

In addition, a regulatory framework should be developed for a more efficient and effective activity of the State Council to further centralize state power in the country, giving it authority to monitor the implementation by regional authorities of decisions of the President and the Government of the country. Due to the fact that the activities of the State Council are closely related to the problems of interaction between the Government of the Russian Federation and the executive branch of the regions, it is necessary to fix in the Federal constitutional law «On the Government of the Russian Federation» the mechanism for its cooperation with this advisory body under the head of state.

The second major instrument in the hands of the head of state to centralize the executive branch in the country and increase its effectiveness was the institution of plenipotentiaries of the President of the Russian Federation in federal districts.

The creation by the Presidential Decree «On the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Federal District» dated 13.05.2000 № 849 (About, 2000: 2112) on the territory of Russia of seven federal districts was quite widely commented on over the past period in domestic and foreign educational and scientific literature (CHERTKOV, PLYUGINA, 2006: 29-36; SAURIN, 2004; MAZUROV, 2014: 99-102; YASHCHENKOV, 2018: 65-68). It seems necessary to determine the role of the plenipotentiaries in strengthening the executive branch in the country to establish their place in the system of government bodies in Russia.

Some authors attribute the adoption by the President of the Decree on Plenipotentiaries, which contains measures to increase the efficiency of the state (DMITRIEV, 2000: 5-14), to a significant change in federal relations in Russia and even to the death of federalism (FEDERALISM, 2001: 79-80), giving quite reasonable warnings about the danger of being carried away by the executive vertical.

In the opinion of other authoritative scientists and statesmen, it is only a matter of vertical deconcentration of the powers of the presidential power (BADOVSKY, 2020) and increasing the efficiency of fulfilling the functions of state regulation of regional development processes (FILATOV, 2020). Thus, there are at least two points of view on the place of plenipotentiaries in the system of public authorities in Russia: as a new link in the system of executive power; as a new link (level) in the system of state power in the Russian Federation.

It seems most obvious that the representatives of the President of the Russian Federation in the federal districts form a new link in the vertical of the executive branch of Russia (KODAN, 2005: 38-45). In support of this point of view, a number of arguments can be given.

Firstly, in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 78 of the Constitution of the country, Federal executive bodies can create their territorial bodies and appoint appropriate officials to exercise their powers. In addition, according to Paragraph 4 of the same article, the President and the Government of Russia ensure the exercise of powers throughout the country in accordance with the Constitution. Thus, the head of state, not formally leading the executive branch in Russia, is responsible for shaping the state’s socio-economic policy.
Secondly, the plenipotentiaries are not endowed with either legislative or judicial powers. In this regard, the position of the head of the Russian state is indicative, which in his annual Address to the Federal Assembly noted that the federal government really has become closer to the regions and it is time to transfer the performance of some federal functions to the district level, bringing them closer to the territories (MESSAGE, 2002). Thus, the President of the Russian Federation designated the plenipotentiaries as the district level, a new link in the vertical of the country’s executive branch (due to the fact that the executive function is inherent to the executive branch).

Plenipotentiaries of the President of the country in the federal districts should not be considered as a new link (level) of the system of state power in Russia, intermediate between the Federal government and the level of state power of the Russian regions.

Firstly, unlike a number of foreign states, federal districts in Russia are not independent territorial entities uniting a number of subjects of the federation, are not endowed with a special status and are not mentioned in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In Argentina, Brazil, the United States, and some other Federal states, the Federal district, as a rule, is one and represents the capital and its adjacent territories, has its own representation (equal or unequal) in the Federal representative body (or one of its chambers). In Russia, the Federal district is not a subject of intra-federal relations and is not indicated in the Constitution of the country.

Secondly, from all existing branches of state power, the possibility of creating bodies of power at the level of seven federal districts is provided only for the executive branch of the country.

So, the judicial system of the Russian Federation, for example, does not provide for the presence of district judicial bodies (at the level of Federal districts). The existing Federal arbitration courts of the districts were created long before the formation of the Federal districts to ensure the effective administration of justice through civil proceedings (Article 118 of the Constitution of the country). Moreover, at present, the system of arbitration courts is complicated by the level of courts of appeal.

Abroad, this principle was used to create special districts: firefighters, nature protection, park, sanitary, etc. (AVTONOMOV, 2020). The current legislation does not provide for the creation of legislative (representative) bodies at the Federal district level. Federal districts in Russia do not correspond to the prevailing approaches in world practice. They do not change the federal structure of the Russian Federation (according to the Constitution of the country, this is impossible to implement by presidential decree) (NEKRASOV, 2001: 18-19).

It seems that the institution of plenipotentiaries in the system of government of Russia occupies a special place. On the one hand, the envoy is an official representing the President of the Russian Federation within the relevant Federal district. On the other hand, as a Federal civil servant, the envoy is part of the Administration of the President of Russia. At the same time, the plenipotentiary representative is appointed to the post and dismissed personally by the head of state on the proposal of the Head of the Presidential Administration of Russia. However, the plenipotentiary is subordinate exclusively to the head of state, resigns at the same time as the termination of powers of the President of the Russian Federation, who appointed him. Deputy Plenipotentiaries are appointed and dismissed, as well as encouraged and subjected to disciplinary action by the Head of the Administration of the President of Russia.

It seems necessary to constitutionally consolidate the legal status of the plenipotentiary of the President in the federal district, clearly defining his place in the system of state authorities. This need arose under the influence of a number of reasons.

Firstly, the Government of the Russian Federation, many federal ministries and departments, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia reacted very quickly and violently to the aforementioned decree of the head of state on the creation of Federal districts. For example, the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation initiated the introduction of the posts of seven Deputy Prosecutor General of the country, who are located in the territorial centers of the formed Federal districts, have the appropriate procedural powers. Moreover, while in the position of deputies of the Prosecutor General, they are subordinate exclusively to him. Unlike prosecutors of constituent entities of Russia, instructions from the heads of structural units of
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the General Prosecutor’s Office, who are senior assistants to the General Prosecutor, are advisory in nature to them.

Similar structures, but with less authority, were created by the Federal Security Service and a number of other Federal ministries and departments, primarily the power bloc, reporting directly to the head of state.

However, due to the fact that the status of federal districts is not reflected in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the legal framework for introducing amendments and additions to federal legislation on Federal executive bodies, which provides for the adjustment of the structure of federal ministries and departments and the creation of a system of federal district territorial divisions of Federal ministries, services and agencies are missing.

Secondly, in accordance with the decrees of the President of the Russian Federation on the establishment of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the permanent members of the Security Council of the country include all seven plenipotentiary representatives of the President of the Russian Federation in the Federal districts. This state body is also not reflected in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, however, after the liquidation of the Defense Council by the first President of Russia B. Yeltsin, the actual significance of the Security Council of the Russian Federation has grown tremendously. By participating in the work of the Security Council, plenipotentiaries may state the most pressing problems in ensuring security in the Federal districts for timely response from the federal center (for example, possible separatist actions and the state of corruption in the regional executive branch).

The place of the plenipotentiary is largely determined by his competence, that is, by the totality of objects of jurisdiction, rights and obligations. As noted above, the subjects of reference are understood as spheres of public life in which a specific state body operates, and rights and obligations are the limits of its capabilities in a particular sphere of public life. Based on this theoretical premise, we can distinguish a number of spheres of public life, the main tasks that make up the subjects of authority. Such are, for example, the sphere of implementation by state authorities of the main directions of the state’s domestic and foreign policy, determined by the President of the Russian Federation, the sphere of implementation of the personnel policy in the federal district by the head of state. Rights and obligations are, although the second, but no less important component of the competence of any state body.

The rights and duties of the plenipotentiaries can be divided into several groups: a) on the implementation of the personnel policy of the head of state; b) socio-economic; c) on the organization of coordination and interaction of state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and territorial executive bodies; d) organizational; e) control; f) analytical.

All of the above powers testify to the executive nature of the institution of plenipotentiaries of the President of the Russian Federation in Federal districts.

The first group, for example, should include the rights of the plenipotentiary to submit proposals to the relevant federal executive bodies on the encouragement of the heads of their territorial bodies located within the federal district, as well as the application of disciplinary measures against them.

The group of socio-economic powers includes, for example, the powers to develop, together with inter-regional associations of economic interaction of the constituent entities of Russia, programs for the socio-economic development of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation within the Federal district.

To exercise the third group of powers, the plenipotentiary organizes, on behalf of the President of Russia, conciliation procedures to resolve disagreements between federal and regional government bodies. He coordinates draft decisions of Federal government bodies affecting the interests of the federal district or a constituent entity of Russia within its borders.

The control and analytical powers of the envoy are extremely wide. So, for example, it organizes control over the implementation of federal laws, decrees and orders of the President of the country, decrees and orders of the Government of Russia, implementation of Federal programs in the federal district, attracts employees of the Main Control Directorate of the head of state, and, if necessary, employees of Federal executive bodies authorities and their
territorial bodies to conduct inspections, analyze the state of affairs in organizations located within the Federal district.

The practice of the plenipotentiaries has revealed the inadequacy of providing them with mainly coordinating functions, as formulated in regulatory documents. Already now, plenipotentiaries, due to various circumstances, are forced to interfere with the competence of executive authorities.

The effective fulfillment by the plenipotentiaries of the functions of centralizing the executive branch and coordinating its regional level is impossible without the legalization of a wide range of their oversight and control powers. In this context, the contradictions between their legal status and powers, on the one hand, and the actual role and place in the system of the state apparatus of modern Russia, on the other hand, are very significant. The regulatory legal acts on envoys contain a lot of ambiguities and contradictions. It is necessary to overcome this discrepancy between the legal status of envoys and what really exists in practice.

CONCLUSIONS
1. The State Council of the Russian Federation and the plenipotentiary representatives of the President of Russia in the Federal districts have played a significant role in coordinating the executive power system in the country and overcoming centrifugal political trends, from 2000 to the present.

2. In order to increase the role and significance of these executive institutions in the processes of strengthening the executive power system in the country, it is necessary to expand the system of their control and supervisory powers, especially as regards compliance by executive authorities with the current legislation.

3. To enhance the legal status of the State Council of the Russian Federation and plenipotentiaries of the President of Russia in the Federal districts, provisions on them should be consolidated in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

4. It is necessary to detail in the current legislation the mechanism for the interaction of these executive institutions with other public authorities.

REFERENCES


Enhancing the role and place of the State Council of the Russian Federation and plenipotentiaries of the President of Russia in the federal districts in coordinating the system of executive power in the country and overcoming centrifugal political trends

Reforçar o papel e o lugar do Conselho de Estado da Federação Russa e dos plenipotenciários do Presidente da Rússia nos distritos federais na coordenação do sistema de poder executivo do país e na superação de tendências políticas centrifugas

Mejorar el papel y el lugar del Consejo de Estado de la Federación de Rusia y los plenipotenciarios del Presidente de Rusia en los distritos federales para coordinar el sistema del poder ejecutivo en el país y superar las tendencias políticas centrifugas.

Resumo
Este artigo é dedicado à análise dos problemas e perspectivas de aumentar o papel e o lugar do Conselho de Estado da Federação Russa e dos representantes plenipotenciários do Presidente da Rússia nos distritos federais na coordenação do sistema de poder executivo do país e na superação tendências políticas centrifugas. Nesse sentido, os autores desenvolveram e justificaram uma série de medidas para resolver esses problemas. Isso não apenas fortalecerá o sistema de poder executivo do país, mas também garantirá a soberania estatal, a independência e a integridade territorial da Federação Russa em um mundo em rápida globalização.


Abstract
This article is devoted to the analysis of the problems and prospects of increasing the role and place of the State Council of the Russian Federation and plenipotentiary representatives of the President of Russia in the federal districts in coordinating the system of executive power in the country and overcoming centrifugal political trends. In this regard, the authors have developed and justified a number of measures to resolve these problems. This will not only strengthen the system of executive power in the country, but also ensure the state sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation in a rapidly globalizing world.

Keywords: State Council. Russian Federation. Executive branch. System coordination.

Resumen
Este artículo está dedicado al análisis de los problemas y perspectivas de aumentar el papel y el lugar del Consejo de Estado de la Federación de Rusia y los representantes plenipotenciarios del Presidente de Rusia en los distritos federales para coordinar el sistema del poder ejecutivo en el país y superar tendencias políticas centrifugas. En este sentido, los autores han desarrollado y justificado una serie de medidas para resolver estos problemas. Esto no sólo fortalecerá el sistema de poder ejecutivo en el país, sino que también garantizará la soberanía estatal, la independencia y la integridad territorial de la Federación de Rusia en un mundo que se globaliza rápidamente.